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GLOBAL WARMING:  
A SECOND COMING FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
Deepa Badrinarayana∗ 
“It makes out that both sides have the Greater Good of the Nation in 
mind–but merely disagree about the means by which to achieve it.” 
“Go on, Government, quibble. Bargain. Beat it down.  
Say something.” 
 
—Arundhati Roy1 
 
Abstract: Currently, there are no adequate mechanisms under international law to balance 
the competing tensions climate change presents to state sovereignty. On one hand, climate 
change threatens state sovereignty because the catastrophic loss of life and property of 
millions of people would deprive states of control over their domestic territories. Yet, other 
states rely on claims of their sovereignty to reject international legal obligations to mitigate 
climate change. This Article attributes the inadequacy of international law in the climate 
context to the evolution of the international community into an economic union that has 
historically privileged material interests over legal rights. It argues that given the high 
improbability of supplanting this economic union with a legal union that protects sovereign 
rights while also checking sovereign powers, an entirely innovative approach is necessary to 
redress climate change-related rights violations. It further argues that the focus of law and 
policy makers should shift away from inadequate explanations of the relevance of 
international law provided by current international legal theories toward normative-based 
solutions to address violations of both sovereignty and human rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Of the 190-plus nations in the international community, only about 
twenty core nations effectively control climate-change action2—even 
though climate change threatens the lives and property of millions of 
people. Current legal scholarship focuses on why, how, and to what 
extent these twenty countries must share the burdens of mitigation and 
                                                     
2. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Post-Mortem, 
104 AM. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 1), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1553167 (noting that about twenty-five 
countries, including all the major world economies, negotiated the Copenhagen Accord). 
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adaptation, based on their historical levels of carbon emissions and their 
proportionately higher economic wealth.3 Most of these analyses 
emphasize international legal and policy responses that would maintain 
the economic status quo of core countries while simultaneously reducing 
carbon emissions. Indeed, the thrust of international climate change 
negotiations has been on allocating varying costs to core nations.4 
This Article examines a different issue: why international law does 
not provide adequate redress to about eighty percent of the world’s 
population whose lives and property are threatened by climate change, 
and whose governments may thus effectively be denied sovereign 
control over their domestic affairs. It argues that state behavior in the 
context of climate change is currently consistent with historic 
international legal responses to rights violations generally, and thus, 
mitigating violations of sovereignty will require new approaches in 
international law. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I presents a case for treating 
climate change as a threat to sovereignty because it compromises a 
state’s ability to protect its citizens’ rights to life and property. This Part 
also contends that an absence of judicial mechanisms, notwithstanding 
the principle of the sovereign equality of nations, leads to differences in 
the abilities of nations to fully exercise and safeguard their sovereign 
interests. Part II argues that international law is limited in addressing 
threats to rights associated with climate change because the community 
of nations is an economic/trade/material union whose material needs 
take precedence over other rights. In making this argument, this Part 
provides a brief historical review of trade relations and international law, 
emphasizing the role and influence of empires. This Part also argues that 
this economic union permeates international law’s response to climate 
change and concludes that the insufficiency of international institutional 
                                                     
3. See generally, Cass R. Sunstein & Eric A. Posner, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits be 
Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51 (2009) (discussing the limits of a per capita 
based emissions-reduction calculation and advocating the need for a different approach that would 
fully reflect the  total emissions of nations). 
4. See, e.g., Christopher E. Angell, Assessment Climate Agreement Principles: The Tension 
Between Early Equivalent Actions and Variable Costs, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 213, 214–15, 240 
(2010) (noting that the thrust of climate negotiations, including the recent negotiations at 
Copenhagen, has been on dividing responsibilities, and concluding that the Kyoto Protocol failed 
because it was a poor burden-sharing arrangement). Even among signatories, notably the European 
Union, burden sharing is an important component of climate action. See David B. Hunter & Nuno 
Lacasta, Lessons Learned from the European Union’s Climate Policy, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 575, 582 
(2009) (noting that nations joining the European Union were bound by the targets they 
independently accepted under the Kyoto Protocol in 1997). 
Deepa post DTP.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2010  9:51 AM 
256 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:253 
 
responses to climate change is an expected outgrowth of the prominence 
given to economic interests. 
Part III demonstrates that establishing a legal union of sovereign 
states can overcome the limitations posed by the current economic union 
of sovereign states. This Part references the United States’s federalism 
as a potential model. Despite disagreements between sovereign U.S. 
states and the federal government, the former can seek protection for 
their citizens through judicial mechanisms, a recourse unavailable in the 
international context. This protection is attributed to a union based on 
law—the U.S. Constitution—which grants rights and places checks on 
powers that affect sovereign rights. International law, on the other hand, 
lacks effective legal mechanisms to protect sovereign interests. 
Part IV summarizes the challenges that climate change presents to 
international law and proposes several ways to rethink international 
climate action. Law- and policy-makers should shift their focus away 
from current legal theories and instead focus on finding solutions that 
provide consequences for noncompliance and protect threatened states’ 
sovereign authority. 
I. GLOBAL WARMING: OF SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND 
WRONGS 
Climate change threatens the sovereignty of nations in several 
geographic regions. However, sovereignty loss has not received due 
attention within current scholarship, which is still rooted in the notion 
that sovereignty gives states the right to reject international legal 
obligations. 
A. Climate Change and the Dark Side of Sovereignty 
The reach of international law depends on state consent.5 Discussions 
about the principle of sovereignty usually center on the extent to which a 
state may be subject to international law absent its consent.6 These 
contentions come to the fore in the context of climate change as well, not 
only in terms of state consent to mitigation treaties, but also because 
                                                     
5. State sovereignty defines the scope of international law in that a sovereign state’s national 
affairs are subject to supranational legal intervention only to the extent that the state voluntarily 
divests its sovereign control and rights. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 125–26 (Robert 
Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996). 
6. See generally Stephen D. Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty, in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY 
21 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001) (noting that without state consent, be it through voluntary 
agreement or coercion, sovereignty limits international options and requires innovative solutions). 
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climate change can threaten traditional sovereign rights over domestic 
affairs. 
Although there are several types of sovereignty,7 the concept of 
sovereignty as the right of nations to manage their domestic affairs 
without external interference is most relevant here.8 Sovereignty in this 
sense implies the co-equality of states, which have equal rights to choose 
when and to what extent they will cede their exclusive authority over 
domestic affairs to an external authority.9 Coequal sovereignty ensures 
that all nations can protect their citizens’ rights to life and property.10 
Climate change is a threat to the land and life of people in several 
nations, particularly in vulnerable regions such as Asia, parts of Africa, 
and low-lying island nations.11 Climate-change-related sea-level rise is 
projected to destroy property, endanger life, threaten livelihood, spread 
diseases, and displace massive numbers of people.12 Its impact has 
already been observed in Tuvalu, Bangladesh, and Maldives.13 These 
nations are effectively forced to relinquish their territories to the extent 
                                                     
7. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 11–22 (1999). Krasner 
identifies four types of sovereignty: (1) domestic sovereignty (referring to internal organization of 
state authority and the effectiveness of the authority); (2) interdependence sovereignty (referring to 
control over transborder issues or, more precisely, the loss of sovereignty when states cannot control 
transboundary movements of goods and ideas); (3) international legal sovereignty (referring to the 
equal status of states in the international legal community and the recognition of states “with 
territory and formal jurisdiction,” and “juridical equality”); and (4) Westphalian sovereignty 
(referring to principles of “territoriality and exclusion of external actors from domestic authority 
structures”). Id. 
8. See generally OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 125–26 (noting that 
sovereignty gives states “exclusive competence” within their borders and that states are therefore 
not subject to another state’s sovereign authority). 
9. Id.; see also Krasner, supra note 6, at 25–28 (noting that states can cede their Westphalian or 
international legal sovereignty by contract, convention, coercion, or imposition; the latter two occur 
mostly when powerful nations impose their wills on weaker states). 
10. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 125 (“Although states are often referred 
to as ‘sovereign’ states, that is descriptive of their internal constitutional position rather than their 
legal status on the international plane.”). 
11. For an overview of potential impacts from climate change, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY. 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 7–22 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007), available 
at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/contents.html [hereinafter REPORT ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE]; see also Andrew C. Revkin, Poor Nations to Bear the Brunt as World Warms, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2007, at A1. 
12. REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 11, at 317–18. 
13. See, e.g., Adam Hadhazy, The Maldives, Threatened by Drowning Due to Climate Change, 
Set to Go Carbon-Neutral, SCI. AM., Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/post. 
cfm?id=maldives-drowning-carbon-neutral-by-2009-03-16. 
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the rise in sea level sinks their land.14 People in these countries stand to 
lose not only their political and economic personalities, but also their 
cultures.15 
Furthermore, the threatened nations (affected states) cannot 
circumvent these threats because other nations (controlling states) 
control the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases that accelerate 
climate change.16 Affected states have little ability within the existing 
international structure to pressure controlling states to act 
expeditiously.17 Thus, controlling states’ greenhouse-gas emissions 
diminish the ability of affected states to safeguard their citizens’ rights.18 
These nations are effectively precluded from managing their domestic 
affairs without external interference,19 and they are forced to pursue 
expensive domestic policies that are dictated by external pressures.20 
This loss of sovereign control should not be dismissed as an inevitable 
consequence of transboundary pollution that occurs in an interdependent 
                                                     
14. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (2003) (“International law confers 
upon each state the right to dispose of its territory.”). 
15. See Krasner, supra note 6, at 22 (noting that threats to state personality or culture would rise 
to the level of an external intervention into the affairs of a state under the Charter of the 
Organization of American States). 
16. The major emitters of greenhouse gases that have not committed to legal obligations to reduce 
emissions include China, India, and the United States. See DEV. DATA GROUP, WORLD BANK, THE 
LITTLE GREEN DATA BOOK 7 (2007). While at the recent meeting of the Conference of Parties at the 
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen all three countries 
made some commitments that they “noted”: China and India only agreed to reduce their carbon 
intensity, and not their absolute emissions, and it is uncertain whether their engagement will prove 
effective in capping global temperature increases at two degrees. See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 2, 
10–11. 
17. The efforts to frame climate change as a security concern and influence an aggressive pace of 
emissions reductions have failed because of objections by some controlling states with veto power. 
For instance, although climate change has been brought up before the U.N. Security Council as a 
major problem, no resolution has emerged, particularly because of objections from China. See Press 
Release, Security Council, Security Council Holds First-Ever Debate on Impact of Climate on 
Peace, Security, Hearing over 50 Speakers, U.N. Doc. SC/9000 (Apr. 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9000.doc.htm; see also Francesco Sindico, Climate 
Change: A Security (Council) Issue?, 1 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 26, 32–34 (2007) (explaining 
the difficulty in framing the issue within the Security Council arises from deep divisions). 
18. Maldives is an example of a country unable to protect the property rights of its citizenry due 
to global climate change. See From Underwater, Maldives Sends Warning on Climate Change, 
CNN.COM, Oct. 17, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/10/17/maldives.underwater. 
meeting. 
19. See OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 125. 
20. For instance, Bangladesh is raising funds to support research towards developing a new 
variety of rice that can withstand flooding that would usually destroy crops. Interview with Imtiaz 
Ahmed, Bangladeshi Ambassador to Denmark, in Copenhagen, Den. (Dec. 14, 2009). 
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world.21 Instead, it is a loss of sovereignty in a Westphalian sense 
because the external actions of other states have compromised the 
authority of affected states over their physical territories and people.22 
International legal mechanisms to redress the loss of domestic 
sovereignty are largely absent. While affected states may consider 
approaching the International Court of Justice (ICJ), they may not 
compel controlling states, such as the United States or China, to accept 
the court’s jurisdiction.23 Further, even if all states accept the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction, it may take a long time to reach a suitable decision, as 
recent regional efforts prove.24 Finally, there is no redress mechanism 
within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)25 or the Kyoto Protocol (the Protocol)26 against the loss of 
domestic sovereign rights.27 The absence of international legal 
mechanisms to compel action against threats to sovereign equality of 
nations heightens the rights violations threatened states face. However, 
this legal concern is by and large unaddressed in current legal 
scholarship. 
                                                     
21. Krasner, supra note 6, at 12 (noting that sovereignty understood as the recognition of state 
and domestic authority may remain unaffected by the concept of interdependent sovereignty). 
22. Krasner refers to these forms of traditional sovereignty as international legal sovereignty and 
Westphalian sovereignty. KRASNER, supra note 7, at 8–9. 
23. See generally Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, The ICJ and Compulsory Jurisdiction: The Case 
for Closing the Clause, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 57 (1987) (providing a comprehensive overview of ICJ 
jurisdiction, the United States’s rejection of that jurisdiction, and arguing for compulsory 
jurisdiction). 
24. For example, a December 2005 case brought before the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights following an Arctic Climate Impact Assessment by Sheila Watt-Cloutier, an Inuit 
woman chairing the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, is yet to be decided. See BRADFORD C. MANK, 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 221–23 (Michael Gerrard ed., 2007); see also Hari M. 
Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous 
People’s Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 675 (2007). 
25. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), opened for signature June 4, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into 
force Mar. 21, 1994). 
26. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for 
signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Kyoto 
Protocol]. 
27. See infra Part III (discussing the approach taken under the U.S. Constitution to address this 
concern). 
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B. Sovereignty in the Climate Change Context: A Domestic, Rational, 
and Moral Concept 
In academic discourse the issue of climate-change-related sovereignty 
is framed mostly in terms of the sovereign rights and interests of 
controlling states. Within this framework, arguments for and against 
action are driven by a sense of moral obligation, rational self-interest, or 
domestic obligations of controlling states such as the United States. 
However, the topic of providing legal redress to states whose domestic 
sovereign rights are threatened is largely absent from these discussions. 
For instance, legal scholars Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein have argued 
that distributive and corrective justice claims cannot catalyze climate 
action because costs of meeting these claims would punish present and 
future Americans for actions of past Americans and would reward or 
compensate future wealthy nations and their citizens.28 Sunstein also 
posits that the United States and China would have to bear high 
mitigation costs, even though they would suffer least from climate 
change, and notes that China might even benefit from climate change.29 
Climate “winners” such as China have little incentive to act, unless they 
are compensated for mitigating the climate change that may otherwise be 
in their self-interest.30 These arguments implicitly ignore the sovereign 
rights of threatened states. 
Legal scholars such as Andrew Guzman and Jody Freeman have 
responded with arguments premised on the self-interest of the United 
States, based on an absolute cost-benefit analysis. According to this 
view, certain “spill-over” costs such as international trade shocks, 
impacts on financial markets, costs to national security, migration costs, 
and increases in diseases, would render the United States a “climate 
loser.”31 Thus, these costs present a case for climate action. This 
nuanced response to Posner and Sunstein nevertheless fails to consider 
climate-change-related rights of threatened states. 
                                                     
28. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565, 1585 (2008). 
29. See Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. The United States and China? The Complex Climate 
Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675, 1682–87 
(2008) (noting that China’s agricultural productivity might benefit from climate change). 
30. Id. at 1697. 
31. See generally Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Seawalls Are Not Enough: Climate Change 
and U.S. Interests (UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1357690, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357690 (noting that it would be in the United States’s self-interest to take 
action to mitigate climate change and that the costs of inaction would be greater than the costs of 
action). 
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Some scholars argue that states like the United States have moral or 
domestic legal obligations to mitigate climate change and compensate 
climate-change victims, but these scholars also fail to address the 
sovereign rights violations facing threatened states. For instance, legal 
scholar Daniel Farber maintains that the United States should 
compensate victims for several reasons: (1) some older Americans have 
contributed to the carbon stock and can afford to compensate victims; 
(2) present Americans continue to contribute to the carbon stock; (3) 
present Americans continue to enjoy ongoing benefits such as low fuel 
prices and efficiency standards; and (4) there may be a causal link 
“between emissions controls in the United States [under the Clean Air 
Act] and the foreseeable harm of sea level rise,”32 as noted in the United 
States Supreme Court decision Massachusetts v. EPA.33 
In light of current legal scholarship, climate-change action apparently 
depends on the willingness of American (or Chinese) citizens to bear 
high costs for the benefit of others.34 Climate-change action will 
therefore require controlling states to change their value systems35 and 
ideological or political positions.36 It appears unlikely that concerns 
regarding the loss of threatened states’ sovereign rights will motivate 
controlling states to take measures to mitigate climate change. This state 
of affairs raises the more fundamental question of whether international 
law is simply state voluntarism guised as sovereign rights, or whether 
international law can compel adherence to sovereign equality and 
authority, specifically in the context of climate change. In other words, is 
                                                     
32. Daniel A. Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate Change Victims in 
a Complex World, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 377, 396–99, 402–03 [hereinafter Farber, The Case for 
Climate Compensation]. See also Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay, 
23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 26–35 (2007) (arguing that beneficiaries, the public, polluters, or 
climate change winners should pay victims of climate change). However, Farber also makes a case 
for imposing strict, joint and several liability on the United States, but not for loss of territorial 
sovereignty. Id. at 410–13; Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation, supra, at 402–03. 
33. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
34. Sunstein attributes this problem to what he calls bounded rationality, according to which 
“ordinary people show a ‘richer’ rationality than that of experts, who focus on quantities alone.” 
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 503, 521 (2007). 
35. Such shifts can occur when there is an outrage regarding a problem and its consequences. 
According to Dan Kahan and Donald Braman, neither “self-interest” nor scientific evidence may 
persuade Americans to support any legislation that “threatens practices they revere or bolsters ones 
they despise.” Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 149, 165 (2006). They argue that such cultural limits can only be overcome when 
policy-makers present a balanced regulation that satisfies a broad spectrum of people’s views. Id. at 
168. 
36. Id. at 163. 
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international law relevant for rights violations associated with climate 
change? 
II.  THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC UNION LIMITS 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE ACTION 
International law is limited in the climate-change context because the 
international community is primarily a product of trade and economic 
relations based on the pursuit of material interests, as opposed to the 
pursuit of common, legally enshrined rights and power-sharing 
mechanisms. This economic unity has historically provided only limited 
protection of rights because it privileges economic interests over 
protection against threats to sovereign powers. Therefore, the 
international legal response to climate change privileges the economic 
interests of states, as opposed to preserving the rights of any individual 
state or its people. 
A. The International Community is a Product of Trade and Economic 
Relations 
This Section focuses on one significant part of world history: the 
international movement and integration of people in pursuit of economic 
or material interests. As discussed in this Article, such interests include 
resources, natural and artificial, with economic value. The terms 
economic, material, and trade interests are used interchangeably. 
Whereas narratives of modern international law generally concentrate 
on wars in Europe and on colonial developments, the history of 
interactions among world communities through trade dates back to as 
early as 430 B.C.,37 and continues up to the modern GATT-WTO38 
                                                     
37. See WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, A SPLENDID EXCHANGE 21 (2008) (noting that historians have 
traced “silent trade” in the Sumerian region during this period). 
38. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was initially negotiated in 1947, was 
renegotiated successfully in 1994 and comprised a set of comprehensive agreements to liberalize 
trade. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994),  Apr. 15, 1994, 2303 U.N.T.S. 
148 (entered into force Jan. 1, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-
gatt.pdf. 
During the 1994 trade negotiations, an umbrella organization—the World Trade Organization 
(WTO)—was established to administer all agreements within the GATT framework. Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (Marrakesh Agreement), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
154 (entered into force Jan. 1, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-
wto.pdf. Both the agreement and the WTO are here referred together as GATT-WTO. For an 
overview of the negotiations leading to the establishment of the GATT-WTO system, trade 
liberalization, and dispute settlement under GATT, see Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 555 (1996). Reitz refers to the GATT-
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system. Indeed, throughout this period of trade, nations emerged, 
converged, and disappeared.39 Nations have also become empires—the 
Mongols, the Chinese, the Romans, and the Muslims—that have 
dominated trade, and transformed the culture, and legal systems of other 
nations.40 These empires were not always established by aggressive 
conquest alone, but also by expansion of trading interests (though not 
without tension and aggression); the empires expanded as they sought a 
range of resources, including pepper corn, barley, camels, silk, gold, and 
silver.41 
The most ambitious of these imperial expansions began in the late 
fifteenth century with the incursion of Portuguese and Spanish traders 
into territories Muslim traders had previously monopolized.42 Through 
the Treaty of Tordesillas, the Spanish and the Portuguese effectively 
demarcated the world into two portions and divided it between 
themselves.43 The two nations established trading routes that covered 
parts of Asia, Africa, and South America, and included trade in several 
goods, including spices, silver, and silk.44 This trade, in turn, led to 
intense movement of goods and introduced nations to new goods, some 
of which became staples such as sugar45 and oil.46 There was also 
increased immigration of slaves, particularly to sugar plantations.47 
                                                     
WTO system as the “centerpiece of the international economic law system.” Id. at 555.Presently, 
153 nations are members of the GATT-WTO system. World Trade Organization, Understanding the 
WTO, Members and Observers (July 23, 2008), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 
tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
39. BERNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 8–9 (discussing how some nations outshone others during 
periods of prosperous trade). 
40. The Muslim empire, although it did not encompass the western nations, ruled much of the 
East and the Middle East by the end of the eleventh century. Bernstein describes this period as the 
Pax Islamica. Id. at 76. See also NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE PRICE OF AMERICA’S EMPIRE 
171 (2004) (noting that non-Western empires included the Russian empire in Eastern Europe, the 
Ottoman Empire in the Middle East, and the Chinese and Japanese empires in the Far East). The 
Muslims achieved partial integration of their laws within some territories in Asia. Id. at 108. 
41. BERNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 20–76. 
42. Id. at 108.   
43. Treaty at Tordesillas, Port.-Spain, June 7, 1494, EUROPEAN TREATIES BEARING ON THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES TO 1648, at 84–100 (Frances G. 
Davenport ed. 1917). 
44. BERNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 168–206. 
45. Id. at 206–07. 
46. The Dutch East Indies Company facilitated access to oil resources for the Royal Dutch 
Company in Indonesia. See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND 
POWER 74–77 (1991). 
47. BERNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 206. 
Deepa post DTP.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2010  9:51 AM 
264 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:253 
 
Facilitated in part by Spain’s and Portugal’s own internal struggles 
and wealth mismanagement,48 Dutch traders challenged Spanish and 
Portuguese dominance during the seventeenth century.49 Later, British 
interference with Dutch trade led to conflict over territories and 
resources that Dutch and the English traders50 resolved by negotiating 
arrangements through their governments51 to divide what became 
colonial territories between them.52 The establishment of peace treaties 
among European nations and the emergence of international law were 
also likely instrumental in enabling peaceable division of resources and 
territories, notably through the Treaty of Westphalia.53 
During this peak trade period, which lasted until World War I and is 
referred to as the first period of globalization,54 there was increased 
movement of goods and people.55 This integration of the world deepened 
with industrialization due to heightened demand for raw materials, like 
cotton for the textile industry, and markets for finished products.56 
Traders became administrators and governors, whose loyalties were 
divided between their mother countries and their colonies.57 By the late 
                                                     
48. The weakening of the Spanish stronghold is attributed to loss of Spanish control over Dutch 
territories, the alliance between the Dutch and the English, and the cost of war. See NIALL 
FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY 74–76 (2009). 
49. BERNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 210–11. 
50. The traders were the Dutch East Indies Company and the British East Indies Company. Id. at 
229. 
51. The Dutch were represented by Hugo Grotius, a proponent of the freedom of the seas and 
international transaction. Id. 
52. See generally id. at 229–40, 241–42 (providing a comprehensive overview of the spread of 
European trade relations from the Americas to Australia, through Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, 
and noting that most of these territories remained under colonial control until the twentieth century). 
53. Treaty of Westphalia, Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of 
France and Their Respective Allies, Oct. 24, 1648, 1 Parry 271, translation available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp. 
54. JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES OF OUR TIME 43 
(2005); see FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 185. 
55. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 277 tbl.10.1 (showing the movement of slaves between 
1550 and 1800 and the population of their descendants by 1950); see also FERGUSON, supra note 
40, at 188 (discussing the mass migration of laborers between Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
India, and China to work in British plantations and mines); Rebecca Durrer, Propagating the New 
Zealand Ideal, 43 SOC. SCI. J. 173, 181–82 (2006) (discussing the increased migration of Britons 
into New Zealand during the 1840s). 
56. BERNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 262–64 (discussing the increase in global cotton trade during 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries). 
57. FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 193. For instance, Keynes criticized the movement of 
investment and capital to colonies on the ground that it was not in the economic interest of Britain. 
Id. at 193. 
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1880s, European traders had established a new age of empires.58 
The European empires introduced new legal systems and forms of 
government in their colonies;59 in effect, Europeans began a 
transnational process of integrating the law, as well as free movement of 
goods, people, and capital.60 Thus, the laws and administrative 
mechanisms of the colonizers replaced the legal systems and 
philosophies in the colonies, arguably for the economic benefit of the 
colonized.61 By systematically introducing notions of contract, property, 
and financial mechanisms that liberalized trade, the empires became 
pivotal in shaping world unity.62 
International law’s role during this period pales in comparison to the 
growing global economic cohesion, particularly with respect to rights 
violations. For example, the benefits of state sovereignty established 
under the Treaty of Westphalia were not extended to the territories and 
people of lands that became European colonies.63 Arguments against 
inviting “uncivilized” nations into the legal community stymied efforts 
                                                     
58. Id. at 171–73. Ferguson notes that between 1880 and 1980, which he refers to as the “zenith” 
of the age of empires, “[a]ll of Australia, 90 percent of Africa and 56 percent of Asia were under 
some form of European rule, as were nearly all the islands of the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean and 
the Pacific.” Id. at 171. Even “the polities of the American republics were fundamentally shaped by 
the colonial past.” Id. 
59. Id. at 184 (“[G]lobalization applies to politics as well as economics.”). 
60. Id. at 185, 188. 
61. Id. at 192–93 (noting that laws such as the Colonial Loans Act (1889) and the Colonial Stocks 
Act (1900) encouraged investments into colonies, perhaps even at the cost of Britain).  
62. Id. at 184. Ferguson also observes: “Nor is it by any means a given that the benefits of empire 
should flow simply to the metropolitan society. It may only be the elite of that society that reaps the 
benefits of empire . . . .” Id. at 12. For additional background on the effects of economic history on 
the British Empire, see Niall Ferguson, British Imperialism Revised: The Costs and Benefits of 
‘Anglobalization,’ HISTORICALLY SPEAKING, Apr. 2003, at 21–27. 
63. As Richard Falk notes regarding the Treaty of Westphalia: 
This transition has been generally treated as of global scope, but it was in reality an exclusively 
European phenomenon at the outset that underpinned a Eurocentric phase of world order that 
has still not been entirely displaced, although much weakened by the collapse of the colonial 
empires in the last half of the twentieth century, and by the growing appreciation and 
significance of Asia/Pacific countries, and especially China, for the global economic and 
strategic balance. 
Richard Falk, The Grotian Moment: Unfulfilled Promise, Harmless Fantasy, Missed Opportunity?, 
13 INT’L INSIGHTS 3, 4 (1997); see also ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE 
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (2005). According to Anghie, colonization resolved an 
anomaly in the application of international law with regard to the legal personality of non-European 
states. He notes, “Once colonization took place, the colonizing power assumed sovereignty over the 
non-European territory, and any European state having business with respect to the territory would 
deal with the colonial power; in this way, legal relations would take place, once more, between two 
European powers.” ANGHIE, supra, at 82. 
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within Europe to extend international legal rights to colonial territories.64 
As Antony Anghie notes, “European states interacted with non-
European states on the basis of ‘discretion, and not International 
Law.’”65 The British, for instance, justified colonization that collided 
with their views on state sovereignty on the grounds that they were 
rescuing these regions from “barbarism,” administering justice, and 
ushering in prosperity.66 In effect, by the late nineteenth century efforts 
to create a world unified under international law deteriorated into a 
Euro-centric justification for subjugating other regions. 
This power dynamic began to shift during the twentieth century for 
several reasons, none of which can fully be attributed to a triumph of 
international law. First, the treatment of foreign populations 
disillusioned even staunch supporters of free trade and colonization in 
mother countries, and led some European lawyers to argue that human 
rights should be extended to the colonized.67 Second, the growth of 
nationalism grounded on a demand for rights for local populations by 
local elites educated in the West gained traction.68 Third, European 
nations failed to sustain peace under international law, resulting in two 
world wars that coincided with increased nationalist movements and 
deterioration in trade and economic growth.69 All of these developments 
led to decolonization. Thus, while there had been sixty-nine sovereign 
states in 1920, there were nearly one hundred sovereign states by the 
mid-1950s.70 
Despite decolonization, however, the basic structure of international 
relations and power remained largely unaltered. The United Nations was 
                                                     
64. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS 73 (2008) (noting a range of 
opinions berating the absence of common ties that precluded non-European nations from 
participating in international law); see also FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 23 (noting Winston 
Churchill’s view that barbarians in other regions had to be educated in commerce and learning). 
65. ANGHIE, supra note 63, at 81 (quoting LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
TREATISE (1912)). 
66. FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 23 (quoting Churchill on the goals of imperialism). 
67. For example, John Stuart Mill, who initially supported the colonization project of the British 
government later became disillusioned with the treatment of the colonized and the protectionist 
trade practices in the colonies. Duncan Bell, John Stuart Mill on Colonies, 38 POL. THEORY 34, 50–
54 (2010); see KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 64, at 105, 113, 121 (citing lawyers who argued that it was 
unjust not to extend certain rights to nations colonized by Europeans). 
68. See Prasenjit Duara, Introduction, The Decolonization of Asia and Africa in the Twentieth 
Century, in DECOLONIZATION 7 (Prasenjit Duara ed., 2004). 
69. Id. 
70. See FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 172–73 (noting that between 1960 and 1964, twenty-five 
new states were formed in Africa and that by the 1950s the community of nations grew to eighty-
nine states). 
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established in 1945, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights adopted 
in 1948,71 and several other organizations emerged that provided 
membership to an unprecedented number of states.72 Nevertheless, 
international law did not metamorphize into a universal system that 
governed actions of states and catalyzed the evolution of a universal 
ethic of rights.73 Eventually, the Cold War subsumed trade relations 
between the two remaining “empires,” the United States and the Soviet 
Union.74 Trade liberalization was replaced by protectionism, and liberal 
investment was replaced by selective swaps among rich industrialized 
nations.75 Indeed, many found the post-colonial regimes were reportedly 
“worse for the people living under them than the old colonial structures 
of government: more corrupt, more lawless, more violent,”76 and 
democratic ideologies in some instances triggered the pursuit of 
“economically detrimental fiscal and monetary policy,” because of 
“popular demand.”77 
In effect, the colonies were barely compensated by their colonizers 
for unfair contractual agreements, conquest of territories, and 
reorganization of territories and identities.78 The only compensation they 
received was inclusion into the community of sovereign nations through 
                                                     
71.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III),  at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
72. JOSE ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAWMAKERS 586, 590 (2005) (noting 
that several organizations that were established after the Second World War became instrumental in 
increasing international cooperation and standard setting). 
73. For example, rights violations continue to persist in former colonies and demonstrate that 
self-determination efforts did not manifest into a sustained implementation of universal rights. See 
ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 5–6 (1995) 
(“[S]elf-determination is attractive so long as it has not been attained; alternatively, it is attractive so 
long as it is applied to others. Once realized, enthusiasm dies fast, since henceforth it can only be 
used to undermine perceived internal and external stability.”). 
74. FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 173. 
75. Id. at 188–89. 
76. Id. at 173. Contrary to established arguments, Ferguson notes that some British colonies 
performed better under colonial rule. Id. at 188–89, 196–97. As examples, he cites the case of 
British investment in global endeavors that led to integration of capital markets and investments in 
developing regions in Asia, the United States, and Africa for construction of infrastructure and 
expansion of extractive industries. Id. He further notes that British investment increased trade and 
migration opportunities in India, but the post-colonial government dismantled much of this 
investment to the country’s disadvantage. Id. 
77. Id. at 173. 
78. For a discussion of unfair treatment of colonies, see KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 64, at 136–39, 
which discusses the legal gray area within which European colonizers acquired territories from 
colonies. Additionally, political leaders of the decolonized nations siphoned off the majority of post-
colonial compensation, provided to most countries as financial aid, stowing the money in private 
Swiss Bank accounts. See FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 173. 
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the United Nations—but not necessarily as co-equal partners in its 
creation.79 The relations of the now independent states with other nations 
continued to be governed primarily by their economic ties.80 After all, 
the world had become interdependent. Trade and quasi-integration of 
colonies had made resources and markets available in different parts of 
the world.81 Thus, protectionist policies did not end trade relations. 
Ongoing efforts to adjust and continue trade links with the 
decolonized world order are evidenced in the case of petroleum. Trade in 
petroleum82 continued despite the replacement of private cartels with 
government cartels,83 and despite international tensions over oil in the 
1970s.84 Trade continued in other goods and services as well, albeit with 
more restraint than witnessed prior to 1945.85 
Ongoing economic relations and trade transformed once again with 
the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the emergence of several 
                                                     
79. The composition of the U.N. Security Council is a case in point. For a discussion regarding 
the various issues surrounding power relations within the Security Council and potential for 
Security Council reform, see Olara A. Otunnu, Conclusion: The Peace-and-Security Agenda of the 
United Nations: From a Crossroads into the New Century, in PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING 
FOR THE NEW CENTURY 297, 311–16 (Olara A. Otunnu & Michael W. Doyle eds., 1998) and 
Kenneth Anderson, United Nations Collective Security and the United States Security Guarantee in 
an Age of Rising Multipolarity: The Security Council as the Talking Shop of the Nations, 10 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 55, 84–86 (2009). 
80. Nations continued their economic relations through international organizations and 
arrangements. For example the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) facilitated 
economic ties between nations through aid and loans. The GATT 1947, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) provided the framework for continuing trade. Jose E. Alvarez, 
Contemporary Foreign Investment in Law: An “Empire of Law” or the “Law of Empire?,” 60 ALA. 
L. REV. 943, 948 (2009). 
81. Ferguson notes: 
[T]he history of the integration of international commodity markets in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries is inseparable from the process of imperial competition from Portugal, 
Spain, Holland, France, and Britain. The creation of global markets for spices, textiles, coffee, 
tea, and sugar were the work of monopoly companies like the Dutch and English East Indian 
companies, simultaneously engaged in a commercial and a naval contest for market shares. 
FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 185. 
82. During the early twentieth century, the British had established a constitutional monarchy in 
Iraq and acted as a protectorate of Arab nations through the League of Nations. The British 
negotiated contracts on behalf of their petroleum companies to gain access to explore and produce 
oil in exchange for tax payments. See YERGIN, supra note 46, at 200–02; see also PETER 
TERTZAKIAN, A THOUSAND BARRELS A SECOND 40–42 (2006). 
83. The establishment of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) spurred the 
change from private to government cartels. See JAMES MCGOVERN, THE OIL GAME 12–13 (1981). 
84. Several Middle East nations imposed an oil embargo during the 1973 October War. See 
YERGIN, supra note 46, at 606–12. 
85. FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 184–85 (arguing that international capital movements were 
tightly regulated after World War II). 
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new nations in 1992.86 At that time, the cradle of modern international 
law, Europe, expanded into a more encompassing union grounded in 
several common objectives.87 The economic transformation on the 
international scale mirrored the expansive liberalization undertaken by 
empires past, but was grounded in international law and the formal 
recognition of sovereign equality. Most notably, trade relations 
originally established through physical aggression were now reinforced 
and strengthened through international regulations and the provision of 
an international dispute resolution mechanism.88 International trade 
liberalization facilitated the expansion of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) that have fostered the movement of capital and foreign direct 
investments (FDIs), in, from, and between former colonies and poorer 
nations.89 Legal scholar, Jose Alvarez, characterizes this governance of 
capital by rules, international organizations, and private enforcement as 
an “empire of law.”90 
If indeed the empire of law is the new empire, it has defined its 
purpose narrowly from the outset—uniting nations for economic 
reasons. The current empire, like its European predecessors, appears to 
have its own civilizing argument that fails to embrace sovereign 
rights91—that economic liberalization and trade are preconditions for 
rights to take root.92 This empire, too, may lead to indirect integration of 
                                                     
86. Id. 
87. See, e.g., Hans Christian Krüger, Reflections Concerning Accession of the European 
Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights, 21 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 89, 89–90 
(2002) (explaining the emergence of human rights provisions within the European Union); see also 
John F. Casalino, Shaping Environmental Law and Policy of Central and Eastern Europe: The 
European Union’s Critical Role, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 227, 247–50 (1995) (examining 
European Community environmental law and institutions and the manner in which Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia reshaped their laws to reflect EU environmental law). 
88. The World Trade Organization was established in 1994 and became the international 
organization for conduct of trade. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 38; see General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, supra note 38;  Understanding on Rules and Procedure Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 to Establishing the World Trade Organization (Marrakesh 
Agreement), April 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, available at  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/dsu_e.htm; see generally DAVID N. PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2004) (discussing the structure of WTO 
dispute settlement and analyzing several panel and Appellate Body decisions). 
89. See Alvarez, supra note 80, at 943. 
90. Id. at 973. 
91. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, at xv (2002) (“[W]e 
are a global community, and like all communities have to follow some rules so that we can live 
together. These rules must be—must be seen to be—fair and just, must pay due attention to the poor 
as well as the powerful, must reflect a basic sense of decency and social justice.”). 
92. This argument is reflected in claims by noted economists that economic growth will deliver 
rights. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGAWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 10–11 (2003); see also 
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laws regarding human rights and the environment outside of formal, 
centralized international law.93 However, above all, this empire places 
economic interests above the sovereign interest of any state, a preference 
which has led to nationalist resistance to trade and investment rules 
within trading nations.94 
In sum, empires have shaped the world and its legal systems, but only 
as incidental outgrowths of trade and material exchange and expansion. 
Thus, in the event of conflict between economic and other interests, 
economic interests are generally privileged. Climate change and related 
rights violations, as discussed below, are no exceptions to this pattern. 
B. Climate Change and International Law: Tethered to an Economic 
Unity 
This Section demonstrates that, in fact, primacy of economic interests 
governs climate change policies, evidenced by the history of climate 
action and by the structure of current treaty regimes. It shows that 
international legal regimes have failed to fully consider the legal 
implications of climate-change-related threats to the loss of sovereign 
rights discussed in Part I. 
Scientific evidence showing that anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases raise global mean temperatures dates back to the early 
nineteenth century.95 During the 1950s and 1960s, this research 
expanded, and computer models demonstrated the relationship between 
fossil fuel consumption,96 increased atmospheric carbon dioxide 
                                                     
SACHS, supra note 54, at 35–39. 
93. See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing transnational networks). 
94. See generally Joseph Nye, Jr., Globalization’s Democratic Deficit: How to Make 
International Institutions More Accountable, 80 FOREIGN AFF., Jul.–Aug. 2001, at 2, 4 (noting the 
increasing resistance to globalization and trade both in poorer agriculturally-based states and in 
developed nations). 
95. The study of Swedish Nobel Prize winner Svante Arrhenius is considered the most critical 
study on global warming during this period. William Kellogg quotes Arrhenius’s conclusion: “[I]f 
the quantity of carbonic acid [carbon dioxide] increases in geometric progression, the augmentation 
of the temperature will increase nearly in arithmetic progression.” William W. Kellogg, Theory of 
Climate: Transition from Academic Challenge to Global Imperative, in GREENHOUSE GLASNOST: 
THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL WARMING 93, 96–97 (Terrell J. Minger ed., 1990). Also important were 
studies that established the relationship between glacial periods and atmospheric temperatures, and 
between oceans and climate. Id. at 95–97. 
96. In 1967, S. Manabe and R.T. Wetherald published the first research based on computer 
models that confirmed Arrhenius’s prediction that a doubling of carbon dioxide concentration would 
result in an increase in average temperatures of about three degrees Celsius. Id. at 99–100 (citing S. 
Manabe & R. T. Wetherald, Thermal Equilibrium of the Atmosphere with a Given Distribution of 
Relative Humidity, 2 J. ATMOSPHERIC SCI. 241 (1967)). Others, notably Mikhail Budyko and 
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concentrations, and temperature rise.97 Studies that could support 
appropriate policy decisions began to emerge in the 1970s, when several 
national research organizations developed climate models to explain the 
interaction between greenhouse gases and the climate, identifying 
variables that could alter predicted outcomes.98 An array of scientific 
experts began collecting data and establishing expensive and complex 
computer models for different regions of the world.99 All factors 
intricately connected to the climate—including soil, rain patterns, and 
temperature shifts—were included in the data.100 Despite variations in 
data,101 the “scientific method” applied to data overwhelmingly pointed 
to a correlation between increased concentrations of carbon dioxide and 
the climate.102 
                                                     
William Sellers, independently prepared climate models that demonstrated the effects of certain 
variables on the climate. Id. at 101. For example, Budyko demonstrated that even a slight reduction 
in heating from the sun could move the snow line to the equator. Id. Computers, however, did not 
reduce the time required for this complex research. Kellogg notes that modeling on a Cray 
supercomputer at National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) took ten hours to integrate the 
NCAR model for one year. Id. at 99–101. 
97. G.S. Callender in 1958 made several recordings of carbon dioxide concentrations in the 
atmosphere. Id. at 98. Similarly, other scientists including John Van Neumann, Roger Revelle, and 
Hans Suess argued that fossil fuels contributed to high carbon concentrations and that “human 
beings [were] carrying out a large-scale geo-physical experiment.” Id. 
98. Kellogg in his work notes that the following organizations developed these models: NCAR, 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration’s Geophysical Fluid Dynamics 
Laboratory, NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Science, Oregon State University, and the United 
Kingdom Meteorological Office. Id. at 102. 
99. Id. at 103–08. 
100. Id. 
101. One variation resulted from a study by Thomas R. Karl and P.D. Jones that showed a 0.5 
degree Celsius unexplained “real” warming for a period of 100 years up to the Second World War. 
Instead of attributing this to global warming, some scientists began to further study other factors 
that could influence the greenhouse gas concentration—including global consumption of fossil fuels 
due to population growth, rates of deforestation, and the impact of other more heat-absorbent 
greenhouse gases, such as methane and chlorofluro carbons. See Stephen H. Schneider, The 
Changing Climate: A Risky Planetwide Experiment, in GREENHOUSE GLASNOST: THE CRISIS OF 
GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 95, at 117, 121. 
102. In explaining why policy makers can rely on scientific predictions on climate change, Carl 
Sagan refers to the scientific method as follows: 
[I]n the methods of science, there is an error-correcting procedure, a set of rules that have 
repeatedly worked well, sometimes called the scientific method. There are a number of tenets: 
arguments from authority carry little weight (“Because I said so” isn’t good enough); 
quantitative prediction is an extremely good way to sift useful ideas from nonsense; the 
methods of analysis must yield other results fully consistent with what else we know about the 
universe; vigorous debate is a healthy sign; the same conclusions have to be drawn 
independently by competing scientific groups for an idea to be taken seriously; and so on. 
Carl Sagan, Croesus and Cassandra: Policy Response to Global Warming, in GREENHOUSE 
GLASNOST, THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 95, at 8. 
Deepa post DTP.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2010  9:51 AM 
272 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:253 
 
Towards the latter half of the twentieth century, scientists 
overwhelmingly concluded that climate change was the “supertanker of 
environmental issues.”103 This conclusion was based on “circumstantial 
evidence”104 that atmospheric greenhouse gases contributed to a thirty-
two-degree differential in the average temperature of Earth.105 One 
conclusion of climate-related research was that climate was a “product 
of complicated interactions involving the atmosphere, the oceans, the 
land surface, vegetation, and polar ice.”106 Researchers generally agreed 
that of the identified greenhouse gases—methane, carbon dioxide, water 
vapor, nitrogen oxide, and chlorofluro carbons—carbon dioxide 
emissions produced by consumption of energy from fossil fuels were 
most directly linked to climate change.107 However, the research also 
cautioned that climate change would trigger feedback mechanisms, 
which would increase uncertainties and undermine efforts to make 
accurate predictions.108 
                                                     
103. See Thomas G. Lambrix, Global Climate Change: A Retrospective View from Business, in 
GREENHOUSE GLASNOST, THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 95, at 51 (emphasis 
added). 
104. Schneider, supra note 101, at 119 (noting that 3.5–4 billion years ago, the concentration of 
carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere was 1000 times greater and compensated for the nearly 
thirty percent less intensity of a young sun and that higher temperatures during the Mesozoic era can 
only be explained by carbon dioxide concentrations). 
105. George S. Golitsyn, The Climate and Economic Priorities, in GREENHOUSE GLASNOST, THE 
CRISIS OF GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 95, at 37. 
106. Schneider, supra note 101, at 123. 
107. Kellogg, supra note 95, at 98. 
108. Positive feedback mechanisms could hasten climate change. The following are two 
examples of positive feedback: 
The temperature increases a little bit because of the increasing greenhouse effect and some 
polar ice melts. . . . [T]he Earth is now a little darker; because the Earth is darker, it now 
absorbs more sunlight; it heats up more, it melts more polar ice, and so on . . . . A little more 
CO2 in the air heats the surface of the Earth, including the oceans, a little it. The now warmer 
oceans vaporize a little more water vapor into the atmosphere. Water vapor is also a 
greenhouse gas, so it holds in more heat and the temperature goes higher—a positive feedback, 
the dangerous kind. 
Sagan, supra note 102, at 17. Negative feedback mechanisms, on the other hand, would neutralize 
or delay global warming. The following are examples of negative feedback: 
Heat up the Earth a little by putting a little more CO2, say, into the atmosphere. . . . [T]his 
injects more water vapor into the atmosphere, but this generates more clouds. Clouds are 
bright, they reflect more sunlight into space, and therefore less sunlight is available to heat the 
Earth. The increase in temperature produces a decrease in temperature. Or put a little more 
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Plants generally like more carbon dioxide, so they grow 
faster, and in growing faster they take more carbon dioxide from the air—which in turn 
reduces the greenhouse effect. 
Id. 
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In light of the uncertainties, serious international efforts emerged 
around 1988,109 a period when the United States faced severe climate 
catastrophes, and spurred the adoption of energy efficiency policies.110 
However, it became evident early on that policy makers in developed 
nations would not compromise their economic interests when major 
economies—the United States, the former Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan—rejected a proposal to cap emissions to 1988 
levels by 2005.111 Businesses also opposed the proposal, arguing that 
efforts to combat climate change presented economic concerns that 
warranted careful consideration before taking regulatory measures.112 
Indeed, economic interest has become central to the climate change 
debate even for developing nations. For instance, India, whose people’s 
rights may be impaired by climate change, is more focused on claiming 
its right to develop113 than on pursuing international solutions to prevent 
catastrophic harm to its citizens.114 
                                                     
109. Major emitters of carbon dioxide during that period—the United States and U.S.S.R., along 
with the United Kingdom, Japan, and a few Western European countries—started a concerted 
international dialogue about global warming. In December 1987, General Secretary Mikhail 
Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan reportedly signed a joint declaration during the 
former’s visit to Washington D.C. identifying climate change as an important challenge facing 
humankind. Golitsyn, supra note 105, at 41. 
110. Claudine Schneider, Changing Climates, Changing Habits: Energy Efficiency and the 
Global Warming Prevention Act, in GREENHOUSE GLASNOST: THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL WARMING, 
supra note 95, at 65–67. 
111. This took place at the Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change 
in 1989 in the Netherlands. The conference was attended by delegations from seventy nations. 
Kellogg, supra note 95, at 110–11. 
112. As the chairman of the Global Climate Coalition, a business association on climate change, 
noted: “By necessity business will look at responses to global climate change from the perspective 
of economic reality.” Lambrix, supra note 103, at 61. Lambrix also commended President George 
H.W. Bush’s free market approach and noted that the coalition would undertake a study to “advance 
an understanding of economic ramifications to be considered by our policy makers.” Id. at 60. 
Incidentally through a lawsuit, the Global Climate Coalition, which disbanded, has recently come 
under scrutiny for ignoring its scientists’ advice on the scientific evidence of climate change and 
instead causing confusion about the reality of climate change. See Andrew C. Revkin, On Climate 
Issue, Industry Ignored Its Scientists, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, at A1. 
113. Developing countries have traditionally claimed a right to develop, a right that has proven 
hard to reconcile with environmental protection objectives. See, e.g., Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, 
From Stockholm to Rio: A Comparison of the Declaratory Principles of International 
Environmental Law, 21 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 215, 237–43 (discussing efforts to reconcile the 
rights to development with environmental sustainability through international environmental 
declarations). 
114. In a recent visit by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Indian government reiterated 
its stance on reducing emissions. See Glenn Kessler, Clinton, Indian Minister Clash Over Emissions 
Reduction Pact, WASH. POST, July 20, 2009, at A11. 
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The treaty response to climate change also mirrors the primacy of 
economics in international law above rights of people and state 
sovereignty. For instance, while the Preamble to the UNFCCC reaffirms 
the sovereign rights of states in international cooperation,115 the treaty is 
devoid of language articulating the relationship between climate-change-
related catastrophes and the threat they pose to certain states’ sovereign 
rights to protect their citizens. The UNFCCC only acknowledges that 
low-lying regions are vulnerable to sea-level rises and requires that 
Parties take into account the special needs of these countries.116 
However, the treaty explicitly states that parties have the right to 
develop;117 that climate policy should be incorporated into national 
development programs; that “economic development is essential for 
adopting measures to address climate change;”118 and that, therefore, 
parties “should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international 
economic system,”119 as well as abstain from taking unilateral measures 
that would constitute “a disguised restriction on international trade.”120 
Like the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol’s implementing treaty is also 
silent about climate-change-related threats to state sovereignty. In fact, it 
implicitly recognizes the right of nations to emit greenhouse gases; it 
also monetizes carbon, which is now traded in the commodities market 
by certain Parties to the Protocol.121 The Protocol establishes schemes 
that at once promote investment in alternative energy and investment in 
projects that neutralize carbon emissions.122 Absent, however, are 
satisfactory adaptation and compensation mechanisms for potential 
victims of sea-level rise123 or adjudicative processes for ensuring 
                                                     
115. UNFCCC Preamble, supra note 25. 
116. The UNFCCC Preamble and Article 8 refer to issues of funding, insurance, and technology 
transfer. Id. 
117. Id. art. 3, § 4. 
118. Id. (emphasis added). 
119. Id. art. 3, § 5. 
120. Id. 
121. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 26. 
122. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is an example of such a scheme. Id.; see also 
Charlotte Streck & Jolene Lin, Making Markets Work: A Review of CDM Performance and the 
Need for Reform, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 409, 413–14 (2008) (explaining the context and reasons for 
establishing CDM). For a detailed analysis on CDM and its structure, see Michael Wara, Measuring 
the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1762–65 
(2009). 
123. The absence of sufficient adaptation measures is evident in the type of adaptation documents 
that are in place. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ad Hoc Working Group on 
the Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Non-paper No. 53: Contact Group on 
Enhanced Action on Adaptation and Its Means of Implementation (June 11, 2009), 
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emissions reduction.124 Thus, the international legal response necessarily 
reflects the primacy of economic and material interests, rather than the 
primacy of legal rights of states or peoples that are threatened by climate 
change. 
Further, refusal by countries such as the United States to sign the 
Protocol was likely motivated by the absence of sufficient safeguards for 
their economic interests vis-à-vis China—a move catalyzed by business 
interests.125 Academic response to the United States rejection of the 
Kyoto Protocol has also centered on establishing the relationship 
between climate change and economic interests.126 Breaking the 
stalemate between the two largest emitters, the United States and China, 
has required a fine balancing of economic interests,127 while claims of 
rights violations are only somewhat persuasive. Even India, whose 
emissions are comparatively much lower and whose population is at 
higher risk of loss to life and property continues to emphasize its 
emissions rights, which are apparently a corollary to its economic 
development goals.128 
                                                     
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/awglcaadaptnp5306110
9.pdf. Also of interest are several adaptation proposals which are not legally binding. See United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adaptation, http://unfccc.int/adaptation/ 
items/4159.php (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) (listing several proposals). 
124. No remedial action has been taken against countries whose compliance efforts have fallen 
short of accepted normative goals, at least in Greece and Canada. See United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Informal Information Note by the Secretariat, 
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/compliance/application/pdf/informal_info_note_by_the_sec_o
n_the_compliance_procedure_with_respect_to_greece-rev-2.pdf (note on Greece’s compliance); 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Informal Information Note by the 
Secretariat, http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/compliance/application/pdf/informal_information_ 
note_by_the_secretariat_on_the_comp_proc_wrt_canada.pdf (note on Canada’s compliance). In any 
event, monitoring compliance with a climate accord may be an arduous, if not impossible, task. See 
Susan Subak, Verifying Compliance with an Unmonitorable Climate Convention, 9 INT’L ENVTL. 
AFF. 148 (1997). 
125. Letter from Robert N. Burt, Environmental Task Force Chairman, Business Round Table, to 
President William J. Clinton (May 12, 1998) (on file with author); Letter from John J. Castellini, 
President, Business Round Table, to Senator Chuck Hagel, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (June 21, 2005), available at http://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/ 
congressional_communications/energy_security/20050621002Hagel62105A.pdf. 
126. See supra Part II.B. 
127. Despite earlier meetings between the United States and China, the meeting at Copenhagen 
avoided potential failure only when China, India, and Brazil agreed to make basic commitments that 
would be negotiated at the parties’ next conference. See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that 
the states meeting at Copenhagen achieved a breakthrough in political negotiations). 
128. See Deepa Badrinarayana, The Emerging Constitutional Challenge of Climate Change: 
India in Perspective, 19 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9–15, 18 (2009). 
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In sum, international law has a place in addressing climate change 
only insofar as it does not threaten the economic unity of nations. 
International law as a system of rights and responsibilities between 
sovereign states and their peoples occupies a secondary position now, as 
it did during the period of international trade and economic relations in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus, climate change 
presents similar challenges to international law as the rise of empires 
presented to the sovereign equality of states in the 1880s and early 
1900s. These challenges could be mitigated by establishing a legal union 
that would provide basic redress mechanisms against rights violations. 
III.  A LEGAL UNION OF SOVEREIGN STATES: 
AN IMPROBABLE SOLUTION? 
Sovereignty, as explained in Part I, provides states the ability to 
manage their domestic affairs and safeguard the rights of their people. 
Even states in the United States, for example, retain certain sovereign 
rights within the federal structure over some state affairs. They also have 
the sovereign responsibility to safeguard the rights of their citizens. 
However, unlike in the international climate context, the United States 
legal system enables states to seek redress against threats to their 
sovereignty,129 as evidenced in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.130 
The U.S. experience with climate change in some respects resembles 
the international situation, i.e., there is a lack of consensus on action, and 
to some extent, disparate climate change effects in different regions.131 
Thus, when the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initially 
opposed national regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, only a few 
states supported EPA’s position, while others favored climate action. 
The resulting tension between the positions of some states and the 
federal government escalated into a lawsuit that eventually came before 
the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA. Of several questions 
                                                     
129. It should be noted that this evaluation of the U.S. sovereign system is limited to the climate 
change context and not the broader sovereign arrangements between the federal and state 
governments. 
130. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
131. See Thomas D. Peterson et al., Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change 
Policy in the United States That Fully Integrates Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 26 
VA. ENVTL. L. REV. 227 (2008) (noting that multiple government and state-level climate initiatives 
necessitates a single federal measure, preferably under the Clean Air Act). For an overview of 
different U.S. federal and state-level climate initiatives, see Pew Center for Global Climate Change, 
U.S. States & Regions, http://www.pewclimate.org/states-regions (last visited Mar. 19, 2010). 
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addressed by the Supreme Court, the threshold issue was whether a state 
had standing to sue the EPA for failing to implement federal regulations 
to control climate change.132 
The Court held that Massachusetts had standing to bring the action 
because it had shown a particularized injury, causation, and 
redressability.133 The Supreme Court opined that Massachusetts suffered 
injury because of rise in global sea levels that would affect 
Massachusetts as a landowner through the loss of coastal property and 
cost it billions of dollars in remediation.134 The Court rejected the EPA’s 
argument that carbon emissions outside the United States made it 
impossible to prove a strong causal relationship between a failure to 
regulate carbon emissions within the United States and climate-change-
related rise in sea levels in Massachusetts.135 Similarly, the Court found 
that measures taken by the EPA would incrementally remedy climate 
change.136 In effect, the Supreme Court made a determination based on 
the applicable rule of law and the legal rights of the state of 
Massachusetts, rather than considering whether climate action would be 
in the economic interest of the federal government. 
The Supreme Court specifically emphasized the “special position and 
interest of Massachusetts”137 as a “sovereign state.”138 Citing Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper Co.,139 the Court noted that a state has “an interest 
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air 
within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall 
be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”140 
The Court then held that since Massachusetts owned “a great deal of the 
‘territory alleged to be affected,’ . . . its stake in the outcome of [the] 
case [was] sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal 
judicial power.”141 
More importantly, the Court found that although Massachusetts had 
transferred its sovereign treaty-making prerogatives to the federal 
                                                     
132. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516–27. 
133. Id. at 521–26. 
134. Id. at 522–23. 
135. Id. at 523–24. 
136. Id. at 525–26. 
137. Id. at 518. 
138. Id. 
139. 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
140. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19 (quoting Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237). 
141. Id. at 519. 
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government,142 the state, as a quasi-sovereign, could nevertheless pursue 
judicial relief. The “EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions present[ed] a risk of harm to Massachusetts that [was] both 
‘actual’ and ‘imminent,’ and there was a ‘substantial likelihood that the 
judicial relief requested’ [would] prompt EPA to take steps to reduce 
that risk.”143 
Indeed, not only did the Court uphold the notion of injury to quasi-
sovereign rights, but it also held that the federal executive agency, the 
EPA, was required under the Clean Air Act to decide whether climate 
change presented a threat to public health.144 In effect, the Court checked 
the power of an agency within the executive branch of the federal 
government, the supreme sovereign. Yet, at the international level, there 
is no agency vested with the power to regulate behavior potentially 
detrimental to human health, let alone one subject to judicial inquiry for 
failing to perform its non-discretionary functions. 
In sum, the Supreme Court decision is in stark contrast to the 
international situation in several respects and demonstrates the potential 
power of legal redress mechanisms. First, in this case, sovereign 
authority and tensions between different sovereigns were subject to legal 
authority. The imposition of power by one sovereign over, and to the 
detriment of, another is therefore subject to checks. Indeed, to the extent 
that the Court ordered the EPA to make an endangerment finding, it 
checked the power of a federal executive agency, whose inaction—
according to Massachusetts—affected Massachusetts’s sovereign 
rights.145 A similar mechanism for safeguarding sovereign interests and 
placing a check on the exercise of de facto state power is absent at the 
international level. Sovereignty at the international level essentially 
translates only into the power to refuse to accept legal obligations. 
Second, the territorial interest of Massachusetts as a quasi-sovereign 
state received formal legal recognition. There is no formal recognition of 
the territorial interests at the international level to protect threatened 
states;146 the international system hinges on voluntary state consent to 
                                                     
142. See id. 
143. Id. at 521 (citations omitted). 
144. Id. at 534–35. 
145. Id. Following the Supreme Court decision, the EPA published an endangerment finding and 
proposed regulations that could serve as the basis for regulating carbon dioxide under the Clean Air 
Act in almost all sectors. For a detailed analysis of the EPA’s proposal and their implications for 
greenhouse gas emissions regulations in the United States, see Patricia McCubbin, EPA’s 
Endangerment Finding for Greenhouse Gases and the Potential Duty to Adopt National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards to Address Global Climate Change, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 437 (2009). 
146. See OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, at 125–26. 
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take action to control climate change. Finally, the Court formally 
recognized Massachusetts’s legal standing to compel the federal EPA to 
take action to mitigate the danger to Massachusetts’s rights. 
Massachusetts had the right to sue despite the fact that it had transferred 
some of its sovereign prerogatives to the federal government. The logic 
of the Supreme Court would clearly apply to states such as Bangladesh, 
Maldives, and Tuvalu, if an analogous court existed at the international 
level to examine the implications of climate change on the territories of 
these states. 
One possible reason for the differences between the United States and 
the international legal system is that the former is not only an economic 
union, but also a union bound by a common set of rights enshrined in the 
Constitution—a legal union—with guarantees against rights violations 
and checks on the exercise of power.147 A comparable legal union does 
not exist at the international level. Although the United Nations Charter 
articulates common aspirations, it does not carry the binding force of a 
legal, constitutional document.148 Most importantly, the U.N. Charter 
does not provide for the level of supranational scrutiny against threats to 
territorial sovereignty that the U.S. Constitution provides.149 
A natural conclusion from the above analysis is that meaningful 
exercise and preservation of territorial sovereignty requires a legal 
union, preferably under a constitutional document that explicitly 
articulates and provides safeguards against violations of rights within a 
sovereign territory and places checks on the exercise of power. This 
idea, however, is not novel.150 Indeed, the continuing absence of a 
successful international constitutional project compels the unfortunate 
conclusion that perhaps it is impossible to form the requisite community 
for such an endeavor—that is, a community that feels united by a 
common set of rights and checks on power. 
                                                     
147. See generally FRANK P. GRAD, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2006) (providing a detailed 
analysis of the relationship between federal and state constitutions and the powers retained by 
states). 
148. For example, the U.N. Charter calls for universal respect for human rights, but does not 
provide any specific enforcement mechanism. U.N. Charter art. 55, para. 1. 
149. The U.N. Charter recognizes the International Court of Justice as its principal judicial organ. 
U.N. Charter art. 92. But no member state can be forced to accept the court’s jurisdiction. See supra 
note 23 and accompanying text. 
150. See Richard A. Falk, The Pathways of Global Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE 13 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1993); see also Richard Falk & 
Andrew Strauss, Toward Global Parliament, 80 FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2001, at 212 (presenting a 
case for establishing an assembly that would move forward a constitution project and that would 
eventually ensure global democratic legitimacy). 
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IV.  CLIMATE CHANGE: THE UNMITIGATED CHALLENGE TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A.  Climate Change Demands a Different Approach 
Climate change evokes complex legal problems both nationally and 
internationally. This Article has identified that climate change presents a 
risk of loss of sovereign control over domestic affairs, including the 
ability to protect citizens’ lives and property. The threat to state 
sovereignty of a few states is in effect a threat to the foundational 
principle of international law: sovereign equality of states. As 
demonstrated in Part II, the international legal remedy against threats to 
violations of sovereign rights is tepid; countries are effectively precluded 
from pursuing action under general international law or under climate 
treaties to claim sovereign equality and seek protection against threats to 
their right to control domestic affairs. 
International law is fundamentally limited by the absence of 
mechanisms to safeguard its foundational principle—sovereignty. While 
states enjoy the negative right to abstain from participation, they do not 
have legal protection against possible infringement of their sovereign 
rights and authority. As the reasoning in Massachusetts v. EPA indicates, 
sovereignty not only gives states or their agents the right to refuse to 
take legal action, but it also empowers states to seek redress when the 
exercise of a sovereign right by one endangers the sovereignty of 
another. Thus, the problem at the international level is the absence of a 
cohesive legal system that provides remedies against threats to 
sovereignty. 
However, a cohesive legal system requires a union or community that 
is united under a system of rights, and the international community is not 
such a union, the United Nations Charter notwithstanding. Rather, the 
international community has historically been united by economic and 
trade interests. The history of international law is replete with records of 
failed international efforts to give primacy to legal rights over powerful 
trade and economic interests, and of empires, including the current 
empire of law, that have used international law as an apology for state 
power.151 The case of climate change is no different. Both the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol clearly acknowledge the primacy of economic 
and trade interests while largely ignoring a key issue fundamental to any 
constitutional legal system—protection for legal rights and sovereignty. 
                                                     
151. Alvarez, supra note 80, at 952. 
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The challenge is whether the economic unity can be perfected into a 
true and meaningful legal or constitutional union. Indeed, calls have 
been made to establish an international constitutional order,152or even a 
global parliament,153 and to rectify fragmentation of international law.154 
However, such an effort essentially requires states to take a step beyond 
nationalism. In the climate context, a first step beyond nationalism 
would translate into the need for recognizing that emissions are not 
country specific, but are instead specific to the activities of people all 
over the world. It would also mean that climate action cannot be 
bounded by national self-interest, but should stem from a fundamental 
commitment to the promise of law and protection of rights promised 
there under. Finally, a decisive leap would require a disaggregation of 
power from state leaders to supranational institutions. It appears 
inconceivable at present that any nation of the world would take such a 
leap. 
Therefore, a less ambitious alternative should be considered, one that 
the civilizers did not achieve: the incremental and unplanned integration 
of legal rights and norms. From the Roman Empire to the Muslim 
Empire to the British Empire, integration of norms into the legal system 
occurred by the gradual granting of rights and the introduction of 
positive law. In the climate context, incremental rights through 
adaptation measures, including migration rights, may signify a move 
towards such integration. However, there is no historic evidence that any 
empire has ever achieved full integration of the world based on the 
foundation of law. After all, when the policies of the empire benefited 
the periphery over the metropolis, the empire disintegrated. The 
metropolis in an empire of law, the traditional beneficiary of a legal 
system, could well intervene to protect its interests and lead to the 
disintegration of the empire by reducing flow of goods and services to 
and from the periphery. When an empire disintegrates because of such 
intervention, an incomplete legal union ends without recompense for 
loss of rights. 
                                                     
152. Falk, supra note 150, at 219–20; see also Jan Klabbers, Setting the Scene, in THE 
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (Jan Klabbers et al. eds., 2009) (noting that 
federalism could serve as a model for power sharing as parts of efforts to provide a constitutional 
structure for international law). 
153. See generally Falk & Strauss, supra note 150. 
154. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, Apr. 13, 2006, 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1_9_2006.pdf 
(finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) [hereinafter Int’l Law Comm’n]. 
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One could, nevertheless, maintain hope that integration of legal rights 
and norms is possible because climate change is unlike any other 
problem. Climate threats pervade boundaries, cultural differences, and 
religious differences, among other interests. Therefore, climate change 
has the potential of moving the international community away from a 
history of failed efforts to establish an international community 
governed by law. However, for that to happen, scholars, law-makers and 
policy-makers must acknowledge the constraints of the traditional 
approaches to analyzing international issues and use different 
approaches to spur international climate action. 
B.  Law- and Policy-Makers Should Focus on Normative Solutions 
and Consequences for Noncompliance 
States threatened by climate change present an urgent need for re-
thinking international law. While it is uncertain whether states will take 
a constitutional approach, without new ways of thinking about the role 
of international law in addressing climate change, the rights of millions 
of people may be lost. Rethinking international law first requires 
recognizing the limits of current approaches. This Section briefly 
considers some of those approaches to demonstrate that attention should 
shift away from descriptive analyses and toward the normative core of 
international law. It also presents several approaches states might 
consider in addressing climate change and its consequences in a 
normatively acceptable manner. 
1.  Re-thinking International Law 
A prevalent view of international law among noted international law 
scholars is that international law remains relevant in governing state 
relations because states obey international rules155— either because 
states view rules as having legitimacy156 or because they think following 
                                                     
155. See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979) 
(“[A]lmost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their 
obligations almost all of the time.”). 
156. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 712 
(1988) (arguing that legitimate rules “appear to exert a strong pull on states to comply with their 
commands”). Franck posits four attributes of legitimate international rules—determinacy, 
coherence, normative hierarchy, and symbolic validation—which can arguably be applied to the 
rule of sovereign rights of states. Id. at 712. Franck discusses determinacy, which refers to textual 
determinacy, meaning that “those addressed will know precisely what is expected of them, which is 
a necessary first step towards compliance.” Id. at 713–14. Additionally, Franck discusses coherence, 
which requires:  
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them helps their reputation.157 This is not the case with climate change, 
however, because controlling states disregard threats to the sovereign 
rights of affected states to the extent that controlling states’ decisions 
focus on preserving their own economic interests instead of addressing 
threats to sovereign equality.158 Indeed, to the extent that states cannot be 
subjected to the jurisdiction of any superior legal authority, the fact that 
states frequently do obey international rules is no consolation to those 
states facing a loss of rights over their territory and property. 
Legitimacy fails as a predictor of compliance with international law in 
the context of climate change, and controlling states appear impervious 
to the reputational costs associated with their apparent disregard for the 
loss of sovereign rights of affected states. First, unless states are willing 
to admit that sovereign rights lack legitimacy, controlling states have not 
demonstrated their sufficient willingness to comply with their 
obligations to respect the sovereign rights of other states.159 Second, the 
political stance of some controlling states indicates that they are not 
concerned that their reputations will suffer because they fail to protect 
                                                     
 [R]ules to be applied so as to preclude capricious checker boarding. They preclude caprice 
when they are applied consistently or, if inconsistently applied, when they make distinctions 
based on underlying general principles that connect with an ascertainable purpose of the rules 
and with similar distinctions made throughout the rule system.”  
Id. at 756. Franck maintains that rules become incoherent “when they are applied to some but not to 
others equally entitled, or when the standards cease to be connected to principles of general 
applicability.” Id. In discussing normative hierarchy, he notes: 
Notably, states never claim [that a rule or treaty only indicates a State’s temporary state of 
mind]. They act, instead, as if they were bound. They believe themselves to be bound–which 
can only be understood as evidence of their acquiescence in something demonstrable only 
circumstantially: an ultimate rule of recognition. In the international community 
“sovereignty”—however fragile—resides in the rule, and not in the individual states of the 
community. States seem to be aware of this rule’s autochthony. They act in professed 
compliance with, and reliance on, the notion that when a state signs and ratifies an accord with 
one or more other states, then it has an obligation, superior to its sovereign will. The obligation 
derives not from consent to the treaty, or its text, but from membership in a community that 
endows the parties to the agreement with status, including the capacity to enter into treaties. 
Id. at 756. According to Franck, “the symbolic validation of a rule, or of a rule-making process or 
institution, occurs when a signal is used as a cue to elicit compliance with a command.” Id. at 725. 
Franck notes: “[o]ne of the newest examples of symbolic international legitimacy is the creation of 
supranational agencies.” Id. at 730. 
157. Both Guzman and Simmons argue that reputation costs may motivate compliance in the 
absence of enforcement or compliance mechanisms. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based 
Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1827 (2002); Beth A. Simmons, The 
Legalization of International Monetary Affairs, 54 INT’L ORG. 573, 574 (2000). 
158. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 29, at 1688–89 (noting that although a global climate 
agreement would be in the interest of the world, China and the United States have resisted action 
because it would not be in their economic self-interest). 
159. As Sunstein points out, states are concerned with their self-interest rather than in the fact that 
millions of people in other nations will suffer the consequences of climate change. Id. at 1682–85. 
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the sovereign rights of affected states. For example, core nations like the 
United States appear unaffected by the reputation cost of not signing the 
Kyoto Protocol, even though without its participation, international 
efforts to reduce emissions—and consequently—alleviate the threat to 
sovereign rights of Tuvalu and Maldives will prove ineffective.160 Thus, 
it cannot be assumed that states will comply with international rules 
because they are recognized as legitimate or if doing so will help a 
state’s reputation. 
As such, compliance is an inadequate tool for assessing the relevance 
of international law to climate change.161 Therefore, law and policy 
makers must turn to the consequences of non-compliance as a parameter 
for measuring the relevance of international law. In other words, in the 
context of climate change, the relevance of international law turns on 
remedies for violations of basic norms such as sovereign rights. 
The question of loss of sovereign rights associated with climate 
change also warrants a shift away from a second common focus of 
international legal analysis—the theory of transnational networks. 
During the past decade of globalization, prominent international legal 
scholars have argued that sovereignty, which generally impedes deeper 
international cooperation by allowing states to reject treaties, was 
disaggregating.162 Proponents of transnational network theories argued 
that international law emerged from the constant, decentralized vertical 
and horizontal interaction between state and non-state actors across the 
                                                     
160. Sunstein notes that “[a] partial agreement, even one that includes all of the nations of 
Europe, will make only an exceedingly modest dent in anticipated warming.” Id. at 1676. Thus, 
compliance becomes an inadequate tool to measure the utility of international law, because one 
cannot really measure whether sufficient reductions were achieved so as to reduce overall 
emissions. 
161. Some general criticisms of compliance are illustrative. One scholar notes: “[E]ven if we 
knew how far state behavior conformed to international norms, we would not necessarily have an 
account of the causal relations of law and behavior.” Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of 
Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
345, 348 (1998). Another criticism notes: “A successful theory of international law must show why 
states comply with international law rather than assuming that they have a preference for doing so.” 
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9–10 (2005). 
Goldsmith and Posner also note that compliance theories do not explain when and why states 
comply and “provide no basis for understanding variations in, and violation of, international law,” 
but simply assume that states prefer to comply with international law without showing why. Id. at 
10. More importantly, they note that compliance depends on individual citizens and political 
leaders, who may be unwilling to sacrifice other goods such as wealth or security in the interest of 
compliance. Id. at 9. But see Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 379 (2006) (arguing that reputation can provide an explanation about compliance and 
its effect on state behavior). 
162. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
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world.163 Thus, according to this view, international law does not emerge 
from negotiations between sovereign states, but from diffused 
interaction among a range of global actors. 
According to the transnational view of international law, institutional 
networks of “individuals—regulators, legislators, and judges could 
implement decisions on the ground rather than relying on the state,”164 
and effectively lead to the disaggregation of state sovereignty through 
institutional networks. Scholars have expanded on these theories to 
argue not only that private and public network participants shape 
international law,165 but that they also increase its legitimacy and state 
obedience to it166 and transform international rules into an “internal 
value” set.167 
The threats faced by states such as Tuvalu and Maldives, however, 
beg a different conclusion than that provided by transnational theorists. 
Transnational networks have failed to shape appropriate rules to address 
                                                     
163. Id. at 15–16 (describing the phenomenon of increased transgovernmental networks as “a 
disaggregated world order . . . latticed by countless government networks . . . for collecting and 
sharing information of all kinds, for policy coordination, for enforcement cooperation, for technical 
assistance and training, perhaps ultimately for rule making. They would be bilateral, plurilateral, 
regional, and global”). For instance, Raustiala argues that disaggregated interaction through public 
participation can strengthen, rather than weaken, states sovereignty because the procedural 
guarantees provided catalyze hard laws, which reinforce state power. See Kal Raustiala, The 
“Participatory Revolution” in International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 
541 (1997); see also Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and 
International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39 (1974). 
164. SLAUGHTER, supra note 162, at 15–16. 
165. See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 8–10 fig.1 
(1998) (discussing a framework for understanding how non-governmental organization (NGO) 
activists can pressure states through other states and international organizations, what the authors 
refer to as Boomerang Pattern); Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-up Law-Making: The Private Origins of 
Transnational Law, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 49 (2008) (discussing the role of the 
International Chamber of Commerce in the international rule-making process). 
166. Raustiala, supra note 163, at 541 (arguing that the increased public participation of “relevant 
stakeholders” in environmental decision-making “legitimizes the joint and coordinated arrogation of 
new state powers through the creation of new public international law.”). Levit argues that private 
sector actors under the Berne Union are instrumental in transnational law-making related to export 
credit and insurance. Levit, supra note 165, at 67, 72. In response to concerns about the legitimacy 
of these private “clubs,” she counters that the constant interaction between different organizations 
and actors may automatically increase transparency and instill democracy in the process. Id. at 70 
(arguing that concerns regarding the legitimacy of such normative processes could be enhanced if 
institutions interacted with official law makers). 
167. See Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 644 
(1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183–84 (1996) 
(arguing that external norms of conduct emerge from interactions among transnational actors who 
then internalize the norms). 
Deepa post DTP.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2010  9:51 AM 
286 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:253 
 
threatened states’ loss of sovereign rights,168 let alone rules that have 
become part of the internal value set of core nations.169 For example, 
some private networks’ preference for voluntary emissions reduction has 
impeded the development of international rules170 that could have 
accelerated mitigation efforts and alleviated the threats faced by states 
such as Tuvalu and Maldives. 
Another shortcoming of transnational network theory is state consent, 
which remains, and is likely to remain, central to international climate 
change treaties. Both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are state-
driven efforts and compliance depends on state regulation. Additionally, 
the exclusion of some non-governmental groups from the climate change 
conference in Copenhagen in December 2009171 demonstrates the 
centrality of states in negotiating and determining the scope of 
international rules.172 
The notion that state consent is not central to international law-
making may be attractive for several reasons, especially when states 
refuse to act on issues such as climate change. However, in the specific 
context of threatened states, the question of sovereignty is extremely 
                                                     
168. See, e.g., Lars H. Gulbrandsen & Steinar Andresen, NGO Influence in the Implementation of 
the Kyoto Protocol: Compliance, Flexibility Mechanisms, and Sinks, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 54, 60 
tbl.2 (2004) (demonstrating the participation of NGOs in the climate change context and arguing 
that intervention was particularly low in the case of legally-binding response to non-compliance). 
169. See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 530–31, 546 (arguing that Americans’ cognition of climate 
change shapes their response to climate action and that presently Americans reject regulation 
because of their self-interested view that climate change action will benefit foreign nations). 
170. Businesses have participated in voluntary emissions reduction projects established by the 
EPA as part of a climate leaders program. See Press Release, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Leading Corporations Cutting Greenhouse Gases (Dec. 4, 2007), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/7c02ca8c86062a0f85257018004118a6/55fa73a406b24ef1
852573a700581017!OpenDocument. Business organizations, such as the Business Roundtable, have 
been influential in preventing the United States’s participation in the Kyoto Protocol. For instance, 
during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the Business Roundtable wrote a letter to President Bill 
Clinton and Senator Chuck Hagel, highlighting the devastating impact that U.S. involvement in the 
Kyoto Protocol would have on business competition. See supra note 125 (citing letters). 
The Byrd-Hagel Resolution passed thereafter by the U.S. Senate unanimously, 95–0, expressly 
advised the Clinton Administration not to accept binding obligations under the Kyoto Protocol 
unless developing countries did so as well. Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., 143 
CONG. REC. 15,782 (1997); see The Business Roundtable, The Kyoto Protocol: A Gap Analysis 
(June 1998), http://www.businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/publications/climate_change/ 
161.pdf. 
171. See Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., A Brief Analysis of the Copenhagen Climate Change 
Conference 3–5 (Dec. 2009), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/enb_copenhagen_commentary.pdf 
(discussing the exclusion of a large number of NGOs from the negotiations for security reasons). 
172. Id. at 3, 5 (noting the role of states in stalling negotiations and their role in putting together 
the Copenhagen Accord). 
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important because a state’s rights to property and people are attached to 
it. Notably, in the context of a climate treaty, providing for effective 
enforcement of the traditional norm of state sovereignty would better 
address threats to states and their citizens than would disaggregation of 
sovereignty.173 
In sum, it is not enough to rely on theories of compliance and 
transnational networks to explain international law’s role in addressing 
climate change. The focus of scholars, law-makers, and policy-makers 
needs to shift away from descriptive legal theories toward finding 
normative solutions. The equal sovereign rights of states such as Tuvalu, 
Maldives, and Bangladesh are at risk. The focus needs to be on making 
international law relevant when core states remain interested in 
preserving their material interests, as opposed to preserving and 
promoting a just and fair normative structure that recognizes the right of 
sovereign equality. 
2.  Steps to Re-thinking International Law for Climate Action 
The question confronting international lawyers is how to reconcile the 
threats to sovereignty, and its associated rights, faced by states, such as 
Tuvalu, with the sovereign rights and interests of core states, which 
center on their economic interests. Whether states can change their 
behavior to meet these challenges is uncertain, because doing so requires 
an essential redefinition of the foundations of international law and a 
shift away from prioritizing economic interests. As matters now stand, it 
is unlikely that states will establish a balanced approach to reconcile 
these competing interests, or treat threats to the sovereign rights of 
affected states as the starting point in negotiating future treaty 
obligations. 
In light of this problem, meaningful international legal intervention 
will require states to acknowledge the potential normative challenges 
that will undoubtedly accompany catastrophic events attributable to 
climate change. Threatened states will most certainly face continuing 
problems and rights violations associated with climate change. However, 
by seriously discussing the international policy framework, states still 
have an opportunity to at least preserve the sanctity of the normative 
core of the rule of sovereign rights. Such efforts will have to overcome 
the difficult challenges created by centuries of an economic-driven 
expansion of international law. A few options in this direction are 
considered below. 
                                                     
173. See supra Part I.A. 
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i. Acknowledging the Tough Questions in Treaty Negotiations 
Presently, the emissions reduction commitments of China, India, and 
the United States are paramount, especially because failure to curb 
emissions from these three countries may nullify all efforts to reduce 
carbon emissions.174 While this is truly an important international issue, 
another important matter has received less attention—the question of 
adaptation. The present rate of climate mitigation leaves little room for 
optimism, and climate change may well be the reality of our times. In 
the event of a climate catastrophe, the citizens of many nations will find 
themselves stranded—probably without food, basic amenities, or even 
territory,175 in the case of some threatened states—through no fault of 
their own. Given the current limitations on migration, such an outcome 
would mean that people may have nowhere to go, especially since the 
United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR)176 mandate 
does not adequately address climate-change-related displacement.177 
Thus, a meaningful international climate change law must 
acknowledge the possibility of massive displacement of people and 
consider adequate responses. It is conceivable that an international 
framework would connect emissions-reduction obligations with core 
nations’ corresponding commitments to accommodate displaced people 
or fund their resettlement. This approach would implicitly recognize that 
adaptation is not charity, but fair compensation for the violation of 
sovereign rights. 
                                                     
174. Sunstein, supra note 29, at 1676 (noting that broad participation, especially of United States 
and China, is required to achieve the “benefits of [reduced] greenhouse gas emissions”). 
175. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; Jon Barnett & W. Neil Adger, Climate Change, 
Human Security and Violent Conflict, POL. GEOGRAPHY 26 (2007) 639–55, 651 (noting the need for 
assessing institutional capacity to respond to climate change-related adaptation problems in order to 
avoid human security problems). Neither the adaptation fund established under the Kyoto Protocol 
nor those established by the Marrakesh Accord to the UNFCCC may be adequate to address these 
issues. See Suraje Dessai, The Special Climate Change Fund: Origins and Prioritisation 
Assessment, CLIMATE POL’Y 3, 295–302 (2003). 
176. For a general background on the role of the UNHCR in developing international refugee 
law, see Corinne Lewis, UNHCR’s Contribution to the Development of International Refugee Law: 
Its Foundation and Evolution, 17 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 67, 69–76 (2005). 
177. For a comprehensive analysis on the problem of climate change and the potential challenge 
to the UNHCR, see U.N. High Comm’n for Refugees, Climate Change, Natural Disasters and 
Human Displacement: A UNHCR Perspective (Oct. 23, 2008) (prepared by Antonio Guterres), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/492bb6b92.pdf. See also Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, 
Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal For a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 357–59, 367–71 (2009) (discussing the legal gaps in addressing the problem of 
climate “refugees” and proposing a preliminary framework for action). 
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ii.  Recognizing Investment-Based Emissions Increases 
Current approaches to international climate treaties are essentially 
state-centric to the extent that they view the problem and solution to 
global warming as a state problem. However, such a view obscures the 
fact that contributors to climate change may be dispersed within core 
states, in the same way that the beneficiaries of trading relations were 
historically dispersed within the colonizing nation. Furthermore, the 
current free-trade environment suggests that emission increases may be 
tied to global movement of capital, production, and goods to different 
markets. For example, investors from Europe may produce goods in 
India, sell them in Europe, and send any associated waste to China for 
disposal or recycling,178 all of which results in emissions. Thus, legal 
responses should not only focus on requiring states to regulate 
emissions, but also on the movement of capital that triggers high 
emissions. 
iii. Understanding the Limits of Domestic Law 
Another challenge the current international community faces is that 
nations have different regulatory capabilities. Many well-established 
modern, economically wealthy democracies boast relatively effective 
domestic legal systems that incorporate a functioning legislature, 
executive, and judiciary. However, despite the political control exerted 
and the legal systems established by colonialists,179 many nations still 
lack effective legal structures.180 
                                                     
178. While there is no empirical data supporting entire life cycles of products, there are data 
linking investments with carbon emissions. Joysri Acharrya, FDI, Growth and the Environment: 
Evidence from India on CO2 Emission During the Last Two Decades, 34 J. ECON. DEV. 43, 46–47, 
53–54 (2009) (identifying the linkage between foreign direct investments and increased CO2 
emissions in India); Karen L. O’Brien & Robin M. Leichenko, Double Exposure: Assessing the 
Impacts of Climate Change Within the Context of Economic Globalization, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. 
CHANGE 221, 221–32 (2000) (tracing the flow of investments and integration of markets, but not 
reflecting on the potential implications for emissions). 
179. The British in particular have been credited with introducing institutions essential to 
prosperity in non-European states: “free trade, free (and indeed forced) migration, infrastructural 
investment, balanced budgets, sound money, the rule of law and incorrupt administration.” 
FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 269. 
180. See, e.g., Patricia Ross McCubbin, China and Climate Change: Domestic Environmental 
Needs, Differentiated International Responsibilities, and Rule of Law Weakness, 3 ENVTL & 
ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 200, 228–34 (2008) (noting the difficulties in implementing environmental 
policies in China). 
Deepa post DTP.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2010  9:51 AM 
290 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:253 
 
Complex international climate policies may not be effectively carried 
out in states with poor regulatory structure and oversight.181 Also, poor 
legal systems generally translate into a limited ability to coerce state 
action182 and address potential violations of rights.183 Such constraints 
should be considered when crafting international policies related to 
climate change. For example, policies to transfer technology or support 
alternative energy systems might fail due to inadequate legal and 
administrative mechanisms.184 
iv.  Reexamining International Legal Reform Projects with an 
Economic Lens 
At the height of the economic globalization of the past decade, the 
overarching international vision was of a globally harmonized world in 
which a more inclusive “law of humanity” would emerge and replace the 
interstate international law-making process.185 As technology and 
commerce flourished, the possibilities of international law seemed 
promising, although some cautioned against over-enthusiasm.186 Today, 
as the world faces global warming, several established international legal 
theses of the past need rethinking and reexamination. The International 
Law Commission (ILC) has noted that the rise in international law of 
                                                     
181. Michael W. Wara & David G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Offsets, 
18–19 (Stanford U. Program on Energy and Sustainable Dev., Working Paper No. 74, 2008), 
available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22157/WP74_final_final.pdf (arguing that while the 
Clean Development Mechanism is an important mechanism for engaging developing countries, 
there are problems with administration that require greater legislative control). 
182. For a thoughtful analysis on how litigation could catalyze state action in China, see Titi M. 
Liu, Transmission of Public Interest Law: A Chinese Case Study, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN 
AFF. 263 (2008). 
183. For instance, despite being a democracy, it is widely accepted that legal remedies in India 
may not be adequate for providing redress to affected populations. See Badrinarayana, supra note 
128, at 1. 
184. Nuclear energy is cited as one possible option for addressing the issue and in this context the 
recent US-India Civilian Nuclear Energy Agreement is viewed as a positive development. See 
David G. Victor, Nuclear Power for India is Good for All of Us, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/16/opinion/16iht-edvictor.html?_r=1. While this may be true, the 
possible deficiencies in handling nuclear waste must not be overlooked. See generally Patsy T. 
Mink, Nuclear Waste: The Most Compelling Environmental Issue Facing the World Today, 8 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 165 (1996) (arguing that the regulatory and policy framework on nuclear 
waste disposal is a serious and unresolved problem). 
185. See Falk, supra note 63, at 25 (calling for the establishment of a law of humanity, which is 
facilitated by globalization and the consequent erosion of territory). 
186. The transnational network theory that gained prominence during the past decade implicitly 
recognized the expansion of networks due to globalization. See supra note 159 and accompanying 
text. 
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super specializations, such as environmental law, have resulted in 
“conflicts between rules or rule-systems, deviating institutional practices 
and, possibly, the loss of an overall perspective on the law.”187 
The ILC recommended that international law be formulated into a 
“‘restatement’ of general international law in forms other than 
codification and progressive development . . . as a supplement to 
[specialized laws].”188 The loftier goals of identifying and defining 
general international law are no doubt an important endeavor for 
international lawyers. Yet they are not adequate in a world facing 
climate change—where there is not merely fragmentation, but also a 
continuing cycle of economic dependence and a sense of connectedness 
that is deeply rooted in economic interests. A meaningful reexamination 
of international law must actively include a reexamination of the nature 
of international policies, particularly whether a system of rights can be 
established where economic dependence has historically underpinned 
the discourse—as well as the persuasive power—of both wealthy and 
poor states. 
In sum, the relevance of international law to climate change should 
not be considered in the context of descriptive theories that focus on 
compliance or expanding the scope of the decision-making process. 
Instead, scholars, policy-makers, and law-makers should consider 
international law’s ability to attain normative goals such as preserving 
the equal sovereign rights of threatened states. To achieve this, states 
must take innovative approaches to international climate action and 
address the consequences of inaction. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously quipped that the “life of the 
law has not been logic; it has been experience.”189 Indeed, it is hardly 
logical that there is no legal safeguard or redress against threats to a 
state’s sovereign right to control its domestic affairs, or against threats to 
a person’s right to life and property. Absent an adequate explanation of 
law’s role in the climate context by existing international legal theories, 
reliance on experience may be the most viable option. 
                                                     
187. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 154, at 11. 
188. The ILC set out the following topics for further examination: sources covered by “general 
international law,” the manifestation of “general international law” in international and domestic 
courts, and more factual examination on the emergence and codification of international law. Id. at 
256. 
189. G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, LAW AND THE INNER SELF 149 
(1993). 
Deepa post DTP.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2010  9:51 AM 
292 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:253 
 
Experience shows that ours is an international economic community, 
which has historically privileged material and trade interests over legal 
rights. The climate context is no different. Economic interests of 
controlling states, rather than concerns about people’s rights to property 
and life, shape international law. There is no indication that the 
international economic union will be replaced by a legal union like that 
of the United States. 
It is therefore necessary to produce “new products at every stage”190 
based on our understanding of history and theories of legislation. 
International legal history reveals that traditional conceptions such as 
sovereignty will not protect states or their citizens against rights 
violations without some mechanism of legal redress. Climate change 
may well bring about the second coming of international law because it 
demands such innovative legal responses. 
                                                     
190. Id. 
